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SIXTH AMENDMENT-DISPARATE SENTENCING
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
Corbitt v. New Jersey' is the latest in a line of
decisions dividing the Supreme Court on the issue
of defendants' constitutional rights under disparate
sentencing procedures for guilty pleas and convic-
tions obtained by jury trials.2 The Corbitt Court
upheld New Jersey's homicide statute3 which pro-
vided mandatory life sentences for defendants con-
victed of first-degree murder by a jury trial, while
defendants who waived trial by pleading non vult or
nolo contendere4 received the punishment of "either
imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed
upon a conviction of murder in the second de-
gree."' The Court held that the statute did not
violate accuseds' fifth amendment right to plead
not guilty,6 sixth amendment right to demand a
'439 U.S. 212 (1978).
2See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
(decided five-to-four); Chaffin v. Stynchombe, 412 U.S.
17 (1973) (decided five-to-four); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970) (seven joined in majority opinion,
two concurred in result); United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968) (decided six-to-two).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-4 (West 1965), provides in
relevant part:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree,
as aiders, abettors, counselors and procurers, shall
suffer death unless the jury by its verdict, and as a
part thereof, upon and after the consideration of all
the evidence, recommend life imprisonment, in
which case this and no greater punishment shall be
imposed ....
In 1971 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a decision
by the New Jersey Supreme Court to invoke the death
penalty provision of § 2A: 113-4. Funicello v. New Jersey,
403 U.S. 948 (1971). On remand, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court amended the section, holding that manda-
tory life imprisonment is the punishment for all defend-
ants convicted of first-degree murder by a jury. State v.
Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S.
942 (1972).
' Non vult or nolo contendere pleas indicate that the de-
fendant does not wish to contest the charge and carry the
implications of a guilty plea. Curiously, although non vult
and guilty pleas are indistinguishable for sentencing pur-
poses, guilty pleas are prohibited under the New Jersey
homicide statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-3 (West
1965).
5 Section 2A: 113-4 of the statute provides that persons
convicted of second-degree murder shall receive a sen-
tence of no more than 30 years imprisonment.
6 U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in relevant part: "No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself ...."
jury trial,7 and fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection.8
In May of 1972, fires occurred in a Newark
apartment building, killing one person. Corbitt
was charged in connection with the fires and in-
dicted on two counts of arson and one count of
murder, to which he pleaded not guilty.9 A jury
convicted Corbitt for committing a murder in the
course of an arson, a first-degree crime. Pursuant
to the New Jersey homicide statute,' Corbitt re-
ceived a mandatory life sentence with a concurrent
term of five-to-seven years for the arson conviction.
Corbitt appealed to the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court which upheld his
murder conviction and set aside the conviction for
arson under the merger doctrine."
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Cor-
bitt's petition of certification for the sole purpose
of determining whether a mandatory life sentence
upon a jury conviction for murder was valid. 12 As
viewed by the NewJersey court, the issue presented
in Corbitt was whether the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Jackson'3 man-
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in relevant part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury... land] to be confronted with witnesses against
him...."
' U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I provides in relevant
part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9 Corbitt, however, confessed to setting two fires. As a
result of the second fire, a visitor to the apartments died
of smoke inhalation. State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 382,
378 A.2d 235, 236 (1977).
'0 As amended by State v. Funicello; see note 3 supra.
" The opinion of the appellate division of the superior
court is unreported.
2 State v. Corbitt, 69 N.J. 447, 354 A.2d 644 (1976).
'3 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Jackson involved a defendant
who was convicted and sentenced to death under the
Federal Kidnapping Act, which provided a mandatory
death penalty upon recommendation of the convicting
jury. The maximum sentence obtainable by waiving jury
trial or pleading guilty was life imprisonment. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the death penalty provision
of the act placed an impermissible burden on defendants'
fifth amendment right to plead not guilty and their sixth
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dated an invalidation of New Jersey's dual sen-
tencing scheme for murder convictions.
In Jackson, the Court held invalid a federal stat-
ute carrying a mandatory death penalty for de-
fendants convicted by ajury, while defendants who
waived jury trial or pleaded guilty received a max-
imum sentence of life imprisonment. The Court
reasoned that the kidnapping statute at issue in
Jackson placed an unconstitutional burden on a
defendant's right to plead not guilty to the crimes
charged. 4
The New Jersey court distinguished Jackson on
the grounds that the Federal Kidnapping Statute
therein in question contemplated the death pen-
alty, whereas the statute at issue in Corbitt provided
the same maximum sentence whether defendants
pleaded guilty or not.' 5 The New Jersey court also
noted that the federal statute in Jackson allowed
trials to the court.
The New Jersey court reasoned that the statute's
homicide sentencing provision created a situation
similar to plea bargaining, relying on three recent
Supreme Court decisions upholding the allowance
of more lenient sentences in return for guilty
pleas.' 6 Since offers of lenient sentences to induce
guilty pleas are inherent in the plea bargaining
system, the court reasoned that it could not hold
the New Jersey statute invalid without requiring
the invalidation of all lenient sentences offered in
return for guilty pleas.
Corbitt also argued that the New Jersey statute
deprived him of equal protection under the law by
providing differential sentencing treatment to de-
fendants who pleaded non vult than to those who
pleaded not guilty at trial. Under the statute,
defendants who waived trial and pleaded non vult
were entitled to receive a sentence determined
according to the discretion of the trial judge,
7
amendment right to have a jury trial because it "need-
lessly" encouraged the making of guilty pleas to avoid
the death penalty.
14 Id. at 582.
" The majority opinion in Corbitt noted the NewJersey
statute allows the sentencing judge in a non vull plea the
discretion to impose any sentence up to life, without
determining whether the defendant has committed a
first-degree or a second-degree murder. See Corbitt v.
New Jersey, 439 U.S. at 218 n.7.
" The court relied on Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
'" NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-3 (West 1965) provides in
relevant part: "Nothing herein contained shall prevent
the accused from pleading non vult or nolo contendere to the
indictment; the sentence to be imposed, if such plea be
while defendants who pleaded not guilty at trial,
if convicted, were sentenced to mandatory life im-
prisonment. The New Jersey court, however, failed
to find that any suspect classification had been
created and held that sentencing pursuant to the
New Jersey statute bore a "rational relationship"
to a proper legislative purpose.
1 8
Finding no abrogation of Corbitt's constitutional
rights, the New Jersey court concluded that the
sentencing provision of the murder statute was
valid. Corbitt appealed to the Supreme Court
which noted probable jurisdiction in 1978.19
The Supreme Court was presented with the issue
of whether New Jersey's mandatory life sentence
for defendants convicted at trial violated an ac-
cused's constitutional rights in light of the possibil-
ity of a lesser sentence obtainable by pleading non
vult. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, 2
agreed with the New Jersey court that Jackson did
not require invalidation of the New Jersey statute,
but disagreed with that court's finding that the
Jackson rationale applied only to cases involving the
death penalty.
The Court distinguished Jackson, emphasizing
that the death penalty in the Federal Kidnapping
Act put greater pressure on defendants to plead
guilty than did the statute in Corbitt. Rather than
adopting the same approach as the New Jersey
court in limiting Jackson to cases involving the
death penalty, the Corbitt Court reasoned that un-
like Jackson, the defendant in Corbitt could not
completely avoid the risk of receiving the maxi-
mum sentence by pleading guilty.2
The Court stated that decisions since Jackson
have established the principle that there is no per
se rule against encouraging guilty pleas by offering
benefits to defendants who forego their trial rights
under a non vult plea.22 Drawing on several recent
accepted, shall be either imprisonment for life or the
same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder in the
second degree."
See note 5 supra. Since the possible sentence for a non
vult plea ranges downward from the second-degree sen-
tence of 30 years or less, and upward to the life sentence,
the trial court appears to have complete discretion in
sentencing defendants pleading non vult.
18 74 N.J. at 402, 378 A.2d at 246.
'9 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 434 U.S. 1060 (1978).
'0 Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and Blackmun joined in the majority opinion.
21 See notes 15 & 17 supra.
' See Bordenkireher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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decisions, the Corbilt Court declared that a state
may constitutionally offer "substantial benefits" to
defendants in return for guilty pleas.
In Brady v. United States,s2 the Court concluded
that as long as guilty pleas are made upon the
intelligent advice of competent counsel, such pleas
cannot be found to have been coerced and thus
invalid, even though motivated by a desire to avoid
the death penalty which may be attached to con-
viction by a jury.U The Brady Court limited the
Jackson holding in order to avoid overturning all
guilty pleas based on fear of a possible death
penalty upon conviction by ajury.
'
2
The Corbitt Court equated the statutorily im-
posed choice presented to murder defendants in
New Jersey with plea bargaining. Relying on its
recent decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,2s the Court
aligned the facts of Corbitt with that case, noting
that both cases involved defendants who, if con-
victed at trial, would be subjected to mandatory
life sentences, whereas the possibility of more leni-
ent sentences existed for defendants pleading
guilty.27 The Bordenkircher Court held that the State
may impose upon the accused the "difficult choice"
of whether to plead guilty in return for the possi-
23 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Brady involved the same death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act at issue
in Jackson. Brady initially pleaded not guilty but changed
his plea to guilty after learning a codefendant planned to
plead guilty and testify against him. Brady was convicted
and later sought relief on the ground that his guilty plea
was involuntarily made as a result of impermissible pres-
sure by fear of the death penalty if he pleaded not guilty
and went to trial. Brady relied on Jackson, but the Court
found that the Jackson holding did not make the Federal
Kidnapping Act coercive of guilty pleas and affirmed
Brady's conviction.
24Id. at 751.
2" The Brady Court stated: "jackson ruled neither that
all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible
death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such en-
couraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not."
Id. at 747.
26 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Bordenkircher involved a defend-
ant indicted for issuing forged instruments. During plea
negotiations, the prosecutor threatened to indict him on
an additional charge for recidivism if he refused to plead
guilty to the first offense. The defendant refused and was
convicted on both charges and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. On writ of habeas corpus the petitioner alleged
that the second conviction and life sentence constituted
retaliatory acts in violation of his right to due process.
The Court found no violation, reasoning that the defend-
ant was properly indicted under both charges and that
the prosecutor's conduct was permissible.
27 Corbitt, however, involved a defendant's statutory
choice of pleading non vult or not guilty while Bordenkircher
involved a prosecutor's conduct in bringing a second in-
dictment against the defendant. See text accompanying
notes 67-70 infra.
bility of a sentence lighter than the mandatory life
imprisonment which the prosecutor would other-
wise seek at trial. This choice was upheld even
where the Court recognized as "inevitable" the
resulting "discouraging effect on the defendant's
assertion of his trial rights.
' 's
The Corbitt Court noted that New Jersey had a
valid state interest in maintaining an effective sys-
tem of plea negotiation which was enhanced by
the dual sentencing provision of its homicide stat-
ute. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the statute did
not "needlessly" burden defendants' assertion of
their constitutional right to plead not guilty and
demand a jury trial. The Court reasoned that, for
constitutional purposes, plea bargaining and New
Jersey's statutory dual sentencing provision were
equivalent.29 Hence, the Court applied the same
test to the New Jersey statute as it applied in cases
involving plea bargained sentences: As long as the
sentencing procedure does not coerce or deny vol-
untary choice of pleas, it may encourage the mak-
ing of guilty pleas by offering reduced sentences.'
Applying this test, the Court found no evidence of
involuntary pleading in Corbitt.5'
The Court responded to Corbitt's equal protec-
tion argument by stating that every person indicted
under the statute had the same choice whether to
plead non vult or to plead not guilty and seek trial.
Therefore, similarly situated defendants were
treated similarly. Rejecting Corbitt's argument, the
Court concluded that the sentencing procedure
was not susceptible to equal protection violations.
32
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart agreed
with the majority that Corbitt could be distin-
guished from Jackson, but objected to the majority's
reliance on Bordenkircher. Stewart, who authored
the majority opinion in Bordenkircher, argued that
the process of plea negotiations involved in that
case differed significantly from the situation cre-
ated by the statute at issue in Corbitt. Stewart noted
that there is a "vast difference between the settle-
ment of litigation through negotiation between
counsel for the parties, and a state statute such as
is involved in the present case. 's Characterizing
the plea negotiation process as adversarial, Stewart
stressed that a state legislature setting penalties for
sentences operates in a context different from a
prosecutor's plea negotiations. Stewart suggested
that if the legislature were to engage in the adver-
434 U.S. at 364.
439 U.S. at 223.
30Id. at 225.
31 id.
3 Id. at 226.
33 Id. at 227 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 70
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sarial process of plea bargaining by requiring that
defendants who pleaded guilty receive half the
penalty of defendants convicted for the same crime
by a trial, the resulting statute would be held
unconstitutional under Jackson.
4
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, opined that the New Jersey
sentencing scheme was not the functional equiva-
lent of a plea bargain. Stevens noted that in a plea
bargain, the defendant could receive a sentence
determined by prosecutor and judge in accordance
with factors relevant to the defendant's case. Under
the New Jersey statute, however, an accused could
be subjected to two different standards of punish-
ment depending on whether he initially pleaded
not guilty or non vult.ss The decision to plead not
guilty was viewed as triggering a mandatory life
sentence if the defendant was convicted, thus pre-
cluding consideration of any of the individual fac-
tors which influenced a plea bargain.
Steven's dissenting opinion focused on the issue
of whether an accused's fifth amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination was burdened
by the statute. The dissent stressed that a defendant
has an "unqualified right" before trial to plead not
guilty. As long as this right is constitutionally
protected, the dissent reasoned, a statute which is
designed to penalize the assertion of this right must
be unconstitutional.36 Stevens characterized the
New Jersey statute as penalizing an accused's right
against self-incrimination because it fixed a man-
datory sentence for the sole purpose of inducing
defendants to plead non vult. The result, argued
Stevens, is that defendants who plead not guilty
and are convicted are sentenced not only for the
crime of murder but also for having asserted their
right against self-incrimination.
a7
The dissenting Justices opined that the majority
in Corbilt had incorrectly distinguishedJackson, not-
ing that while under the New Jersey statute the
maximum sentences were technically the same for
defendants pleading non vult and not guilty, the
statute reserved a "significantly more severe stan-
dard" of punishment, i.e., the mandatory sentence,
for defendants who exercised their constitutional
trial rights.ss
34 id.
See notes 3, 5 & 17 supra.
Stevens added: "Just as in Jackson, the statute sub-
jects the defendant who stands trial to a substantial risk
of greater punishment than the defendant who pleads




Corbitt was decided during a period in which the
Court has been restricting the protection Jackson
has offered criminal defendants. 39 The principle of
protecting defendants' right to trial was established
in 1968 with the Jackson Court's pronouncement
that "A procedure need not be inherently coercive
in order that it be held to impose an impermissible
burden upon the assertion of a constitutional
right."4 The Jackson Court reasoned that regardless
of a statute's objectives, as long as it "needlessly
chilled" the exercise of the fifth amendment right
to plead not guilty and the sixth amendment right
to a jury trial, it was unconstitutional."'
One year later in Boykin v. Alabama,42 the Court
held that guilty pleas must be voluntary as evi-
denced by the trial court's record showing the
reasons for accepting a defendant's plea in ex-
change for his trial rights. The standard announced
in Boykin for admissibility of guilty pleas was that
they be "voluntarily" and "intelligently" made
with a full understanding of the consequences.43
In 1970, however, the Court in Brady v. United
States" held that all guilty pleas influenced by the
fear of a possible death sentence upon conviction
at trial were not prohibited by Jackson. The Brady
Court declined to use the Jackson standard of de-
termining whether a sentencing procedure "need-
lessly encourages" guilty pleas in order to invali-
date such a procedure. Instead, the Court took a
"bargaining" approach, characterizing as "bene-
fits" the more lenient sentences offered to defend-
ants who pleaded guilty, but failing to characterize
as "penalties" the lengthier sentences assigned to
defendants convicted after exercising trial rights.45
Similarly, in McMann v. Richardson, s decided the
same Term as Brady, the Court held that the Con-
stitution did not protect defendants' guilty pleas
made because of mistaken assessments of fact or
bad advice of counsel. The Court stated that in
order to prove that a plea is not "voluntary and
intelligent," a defendant must show "serious der-
39 See 390 U.S. at 582.
4aId. at 583.
41 Id. at 582.
42 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
" Id. at 244.
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
' The Brady Court stated: "[W]e cannot hold that it is
unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to
the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is
ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the
correctional system . Id. at 753.
4 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
19791
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elictions" on the part of his counsel. 7 This holding
demonstrated that the Court interpreted the poten-
tially broad standard of voluntariness announced
in Boykin in a restrictive manner.4
The McMann Court established that a defendant
is required to make difficult choices in the criminal
process (e.g., the decision whether to waive the
right to plead not guilty) without protection from
sentencing influences. 49 The Court stated that a
defendant "assumes the risk" of making a faulty
decision whenever he decides to forego certain
rights. Hence, only by meeting the burden of show-
ing that his counsel was severely remiss can he
overturn his plea as involuntary.-°
In 1975, the Court further restricted the defend-
ant's range of protection in sentencing procedures
in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe. 5t The Chaffin Court held
that Jackson did not forbid "every government-im-
posed choice in the criminal process that has the
effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights."5 2 The Court adopted the standard an-
nounced in Crampton v. Ohiosa which held that an
inducement to plead guilty is permissible unless it
"impairs to an appreciable extent any of the poli-
cies behind the rights involved."5 4 Thus, the Chaffin
Court permitted the state to force a defendant to
choose between foregoing both his trial right and
right against self-incrimination in return for a more
lenient sentence. Further, the Chajfin Court viewed
such a choice as an "inevitable attribute" of any
plea bargaining system.
55
47 Id. at 774.
48The Boykin Court emphasized the importance of
examining the totality of the circumstances under which
a guilty plea was entered before it could be determined
whether it was voluntary. 395 U.S. 238 (1970).
49 397 U.S. at 774.
0 Id.
5' 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Chaffin involved a defendant
who was convicted by state court on a felony charge and
sentenced to 15 years. After serving part of that time he
filed a petition for habeas corpus, demanding a retrial,
which the Court granted. On retrial, he was reconvicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Chaffin challenged
his second conviction on the basis of the double jeopardy
and due process clauses and the chilling of his right to a
jury trial under the sixth amendment. The Court held
that the second sentence was constitutional, noting the
absence of evidence that the jury had any knowledge of
his former sentence and concluding that there was no
vindictive or retaliatory sentencing.
52 Id. at 30.
" Reported sub noa. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971).
Id. at 213. Note, however, that the Chaffin Court did
not investigate whether any of the policies behind the
rights were violated. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S.
17 (1973).
5412 U.S. at 31.
More recently, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,ss the
Court encroached further upon its decision in Jack-
son, emphasizing that it is not only constitutional
but necessary that the system of plea bargaining
discourage defendants' exercise of their rights to
demand ajury trial and to avoid self-incrimination.
The Bordenkircher Court reasoned that as long as
the defendant was free to accept or reject the
prosecutor's plea offer, his constitutional rights
were not unduly burdened.5 7
The Court's decisions from Jackson to Corbitt show
an increasing willingness to curtail an accused's
ability to rely on Jackson for protection when mak-
ing the decision to plead guilty in the face of
substantially different sentencing procedures, de-
pendent upon the plea chosen. Corbitt furthers this
trend by upholding the New Jersey statutory sen-
tencing scheme which allows discretionary sentenc-
ing for defendants who enter the non vult plea and
mandatory life sentences for defendants who are
convicted after pleading not guilty.
Since Jackson, the Court also has declined to
clarify the "needlessly encourages" rationale an-
nounced in that decision. Rather, the Court ap-
pears to be moving toward a standard that invali-
dates only those statutes and plea bargaining situ-
ations which "coerce" guilty pleas.58 If this new
rationale was applied to the facts of a case similar
to Jackson, it seems unlikely that the Court would
today uphold the decision in Jackson.
III
It may be argued that the Corbitt Court too
severely restricted Jackson. In doing so, it has failed
to recognize an infringment on accuseds' assertions
of trial rights.
The decisions from Jackson to Corbitt can be read
in support of the proposition that defendants are
bound to make increasingly "difficult decisions"
regarding the waiver of their fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights.59 Thus the question arises: At what
56 434 U.S. 357 (1978).57 Id. at 363.
s See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
s' Noting that a defendant cannot be rescued from a
wrong decision when he waives constitutional rights as
long as his decision is voluntary, the Court in McMann
stated: "[Tihe decision to plead guilty before the evidence
is in frequently involves the making of difficult judg-
ments .... In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the
defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment
as to the weight of the state's case." 397 U.S. at 769. See
also Corbitt, which cites the following passage from Mc-
Gautha approvingly: "The criminal process... is replete
[Vol. 70
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point do lesser sentences offered by sentencing
procedures in return for guilty pleas become an
impermissible burden on the defendant's assertion
of kis constitutional rights?
The Court in Corbitt interpreted the New Jersey
statute as doing no more than offering "a proper
degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas."
'6
Although defendants pleading non vult were eligible
for more lenient sentences than defendants who
exercised their trial rights, the Court found no
"impermissible punishment" to the latter in deny-
ing them the same leniency in sentencing. The
Court reasoned that its Bordenkircher decision, up-
holding, inter alia, plea bargaining, compelled this
outcome.
It appears that the Corbitt Court regarded the
possibility of lenient sentences available in return
for a non vult plea as a "benefit" to both the
defendant and the state,61 while it did not view the
mandatory sentence reserved for defendants
convicted by a jury trial as a penalty for having
exercised trial rights. The problem with the New
Jersey statute is that it does just that: It penalizes
defendants who are convicted at trial by imposing
a mandatory life sentence, while rewarding those
who forego their trial rights in pursuit of a more
lenient sentence.
The Corbill Court did not announce any param-
eters on the "proper degree of leniency" in sen-
tencing that would be allowed in return for guilty
pleas. Under the New Jersey statute, defendants
pleading non nult may be sentenced from less than
a year to life imprisonment. 62 Would the Court
thus uphold a sentencing practice that imposed a
mandatory life sentence for defendants convicted
at trial, but allowed"a twenty year sentence in
return for a non nule plea? Ten year? One year? If
the reasoning employed by the Corbitl Court is
taken to its logical conclusion, it would permit the
disparate sentences suggested, absent a showing
that defendants were "coerced" into pleading
guilty under the sentencing procedure. Such a
result is surely prohibited by the Jackson Court's
holding that "the evil in the ... statute is not that
it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers
but simply that it needlessly encourages them."
63
with situations requiring the 'making of difficult judg-
ments'as to which course to follow." 439 U.S. at 218 n.8
(quoting 402 U.S. at 213).
Go 439 U.S. at 223.
6i The Court noted: "We have squarely held that a
State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial
benefits in return for the plea." Id. at 219.
2 See note 17 supra.
' 390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis in original).
It may also be argued that the Corbilt Court's
attempt to distinguish the facts of that case from
Jackson was without legal significance. The majority
reasoned in two parts: the death penalty attached
to the Federal Kidnapping Statute provided an
impermissible burden on defendants seeking trial
and the Jackson statute, unlike Corbitt's, offered
different maximum sentences, reserving the most
severe to defendants convicted after exercising their
trial rights.
The first of these grounds, by the Court's own
admission, is insufficient to distinguish Jackson.64
The second assertion, although supported by the
absence of differences in maximum penalties avail-
able under the NewJersey statute, denies the actual
practice and purpose of differential sentences re-
ceived under non vult pleas. As Justice Stevens
remarked in his dissenting opinion, "Whether
viewed in light of the legislative purpose in enact-
ing the statute or in light of its impact on the
defendant's choice of how to plead, this difference
in punitive standards has the same 'onerous' effect
as if the maximum, as well as the minimum, pen-
alty differed. ' ' ss Hence, it may be assumed that
defendants entering non vult pleas are likely to be
sentenced to terms of less than life imprisonment.
If this were not so, there would be no incentive for
defendants to plead non nult. Thus, only by the
formal approach of comparing maximum sentences
can Jackson be distinguished from Corbitt, which, as
the dissent recognized, is not a meaningful distinc-
tion.66
Moreover, the thrust of the Jackson holding was
that a defendant should not be peculiarly penalized
for asserting his constitutional rights. The New
Jersey statute arguably falls within this prohibition
by reserving the penalty of a mandatory maximum
to defendants who assert their fifth and sixth
amendment rights, while allowing the mere possi-
bility of a maximum to those who plead non vult.
The Court analogized the facts of Corbitt to the
plea bargain at issue in Bordenkircher. As pointed
out by the author of that opinion, Bordenkircher
involved the distinguishable issue of the conduct of
a prosecutor during plea negotiations; Corbitt dealt
with statutory trial options confronting an accused.
Although the majority in Corbitt stated that "there
' The Court reasoned: "Although we need not agree
with the New Jersey court that the Jackson rationale is
limited to those cases where a plea avoids any possibility
of the death penalty being imposed, it is material fact
that under the New Jersey law the maximum penalty for
murder is life imprisonment, not death." 439 U.S. at 217.
65 Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Set text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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is no difference of constitutional significance be-
tween Bordenkircher and this case,, 6 7 they did not
provide reasons supporting that finding, other than
the fact that similar life sentences applied to both
classes of defendants. The relevant questions ad-
dressed by the Court in Bordenkircher concerned the
voluntariness of the plea decision and the represen-
tation of available options provided by the prose-
cutor and court. The Court found that the prose-
cutor by increasing the indictments against the
defendant was exercising permissible prosecutorial
leverage allowed in plea negotiations. Corbitt, on
the other hand, does not involve conduct in a
bargaining context. The state's decision to provide
a statutory penalty for defendants who are con-
victed after exercising their right to trial, while
providing a possible benefit to defendants who
plead non vult, is a different matter. Instead of an
ongoing plea bargain, Corbitt faced the fixed
choice provided by the homicide statute. TheJack-
son Court addressed such a statutorily imposed
choice when it found: "Whatever might be said of
Congress' objectives [in the Federal Kidnapping
ActJ, they cannot be pursued by means that need-
lessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights."' s
The Corbitt Court, in equating the plea bargain-
ing behavior of a prosecutor with the enactment of
a sentencing provision by a state legislature, im-
plicitly approved a policy permitting the legislature
to exert the same leverage as a prosecutor. How-
ever, while a prosecutor may adjust his particular
level of indictments to induce a defendant to plead
guilty, the legislature must enact a standard for the
community. That standard is necessarily inflexible,
as compared with the prosecutor's ability to tailor
the indictments to individual defendants. Thus,
the legislature's attempt to plea bargain by attach-
ing a mandatory sentence to trial convictions cre-
ates an inflexible standard for all defendants. The
prosecutor, on the other hand, remains free to
adjust his indictments according to the particular
facts of the defendant's situation.
The Corbitt decision also impacts upon the system
of criminal justice as a whole. The Court suggests
that a state may constitutionally place infringe-
ments upon defendants' right to trial in an effort
to forward the state interest of conserving prose-
cutorial and judicial resources.6 Such a result de-
S439 U.S. at 221.
390 U.S. at 582.
6 By reducing the number of defendants choosing to
exercise their right to trial before juries and increasing
the number of pleas, the overload of cases tried in trim-
tracts from the goal of uniformity of punishment
for like crimes.7" This goal involves the social inter-
est, as expressed by the state through its legislature,
in determining that first-degree murder is a crime
of sufficient gravity to attach a mandatory life
sentence. That social interest is compromised when
the possibility of a minimal sentence is offered in
return for a defendant's plea of non vult. Also in-
volved in this goal are fundamental ideas of fairness
in distributing justice so that society does not per-
ceive unfair treatment of one defendant when com-
pared to another who is guilty of the same crime.
In addition, there may be serious repercussions
as concerns the "deterrent effect of sentencing"
where reduced sentences are allowed in return for
guilty pleas. If it is assumed that a life sentence
deters the act of first-degree murder, the Corbilt
decision, in upholding a statute allowing discre-
tionary sentencing for the crime of murder, reduces
the deterrent impact of a mandatory life sentence.
There also exists the likelihood that increasing
the incentives to plead non vult or guilty will induce
a certain number of innocent defendants to plead
guilty rather than demand a trial, especially if they
believe that the state's case against them is strong.
Commentators have noted that accompanying the
plea bargaining system is the risk that innocent
defendants will be persuaded to plead guilty.
7t
Finally, consider the particular outcome of the
New Jersey statutory choice for two hypothetical
defendants arrested for murder, where the state
possesses enough evidence to make conviction just
as likely as not. Defendant A, who decides to take
the risk of conviction by contesting his guilt and
confronting the witnesses against him, is found
guilty and receives the mandatory life sentence
under the New Jersey law. Defendant B, on the
other hand, pleads non ul to the charge. Under the
statute authorizing the judge to set a sentence for
any term without first determining what degree of
murder has been committed,72 defendant B could
conceivably receive a sentence of thirty years in
return for his non vult plea. As a result, both defend-
ants, having committed the same crime, receive
significantly different sentences based on their orig-
inal courts will be reduced, thereby allowing the cases
that go to trial to receive better treatment.
" See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 571 (1971).
71 See, e.g., D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: TmE DETERMINA-
TION OF GUILT AND INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 225-26
(1966); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977).
72 See note 15 supra.
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inal ability to predict the outcomes of the trial.
Thus, the statute has created a situation that re-
wards bargaining acumen at the expense of the
social goals favoring uniform sentences for the same
crime. Individual defendants who plead non vult
and predict trial outcome are better off, while
defendants who are less adept at assessing the
probability of acquittal, or who are less apt to
gamble their constitutional rights for the possibility
of a reduced sentence, are, if convicted, worse off.
Hence, the Court has placed the defendant in the
position of making probability assessments in order
to determine whether it is prudent to exercise his
fifth and sixth amendment rights to plead not
guilty and to demand a jury trial. In doing so, the
Court has retreated from its earlier position of
assuring that the defendant cannot, constitution-
ally, be pressured into such a plea. Such an out-
come was found to needlessly burden constitutional
rights in Jackson and to violate the judicial com-
mitment to maintaining free choice in plea bar-
gains. As expressed in Boykin v. Alabama: "What is
at stake for an accused facing death or imprison-
ment demands the utmost solicitude of which
courts are capable in canvassing the matter with
the accused to make sure he has a full understand-
ing of what the plea connotes and of its conse-
quences."" a
IV.
In Corbitt, the Supreme Court approved a statu-
tory sentencing procedure that, in effect, mandated
life sentences for defendants convicted after exer-
cising their trial rights while allowing all other
defendants the possibility of substantially reduced
sentences in return for non vult pleas.
This holding continues the Court's trend of up-
'395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
holding increases in sentencing pressure to deter
criminal defendants from exercising their rights to
plead not guilty and to stand trial.74 Furthermore,
it limits the impact of theJackson rule of protecting
defendants from sentencing procedures that "need-
lessly" encourage guilty pleas and offers protection
from only such harsh procedures as are shown to
"coerce" pleas.
In addition, by relying on Bordenkircher, which
approved prosecutorial conduct in plea bargaining
situations, to justify its holding that a state legis-
lature can wield similar power in sentencing stat-
utes, the Court has given the legislature the role of
prosecutor and allowed it to impose inflexible pres-
sure on all defendants to plead guilty regardless of
the facts in each individual situation. Such an
expansion of the legislative leverage encroaches
upon the defendants' zone of trial rights formerly
shielded from unnecessary restriction by Jackson
7 5
Although the Court did not explicitly reverse the
Jackson holding, its reasoning represents a reversal
of the protective principle expressed in Jackson. In
pursuing the state's interest of conserving judicial
resources by increasing the number of guilty pleas,
the Corbilt holding indicates that the Court is will-
ing to raise the "price" the defendant must pay to
exercise constitutional rights to plead not guilty
and to put the state to its proof in a jury trial. As
a result, defendants in the future will likely con-
front more difficult decisions before trial in assess-
ing the case against them with the comparative
advantage of foregoing trial. Care must be taken
in the future in -order to avoid overturning the
protective principle in Jackson and to ensure that
statutory plea options, such as New Jersey's homi-
cide law, do not "price out of reach" a defendant's
trial rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.
74 See text accompanying notes 39-58 supra.
75 See note 68 supra.
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